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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Appellee,
uase ih

v,

.:Uu-!01

"

ULTIMINIO ZAMORA,
Defendant/Appe.l,J dtit

BRIEF OF APPELLEE
JURISDICTION AND NATURE UF PROCEEDINGS
This is an appeal from a conviction of one count of
aggravated kidnaping and three cour 11s of aggra ,? ated sexua]
assault, al] first degree felonies (R. 128-30) . This Court has
j u r i s d i c t i o i 1 o v e r 1:1 1 e a p p e a 1 p i i r s u a i 11 t : 11: i e p ::> I i r o v e r p r o v i s i o n
of Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2) (j) (West 2004) .
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES ON APPEAL AND
STANDARDS OF APPELLATE REVIEW
D:i d d e f e n s e coi i n s e 3 perforro i neffective] y by not requesting
defendant's presence or objecting to iid s absence during the voir
dire questioning of a juror in the judge/s chamber?
Did the trial court comm.it plain error by permitting voir
dire of a prospective juror :i n chambers without first ensuring
that defendant had waived his right to be present during t:l: le
questioning?

In reviewing a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel,
this Court must determine whether trial counsel's performance was
deficient and, if so, whether the deficient performance
prejudiced defendant.

Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668,

687 (1984); State v. Oliver, 820 P.2d 474, 478 (Utah App. 1991).
To prevail on a claim of plain error, defendant must demonstrate
that the trial court erred, that the error should have been
obvious, and that, absent the error, he had a reasonable
likelihood of a more favorable outcome.
1201, 1208 (Utah 1993).

State v. Dunn, 850 P.2d

These claims embody a "common standard,"

in that they both require a showing of prejudice or harm.

State

v. Verde, 770 P.2d 116, 124 n.15 (Utah 1989).
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES
No constitutional provision, statute, or rule is
dispositive.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Defendant was charged with one count of aggravated kidnaping
and four counts of aggravated sexual assault, all first degree
felonies (R. 2-5). He was bound over on the aggravated kidnaping
charge and three of the aggravated sexual assault charges (R. 2324).

A jury convicted him, and the court sentenced him to four

fifteen-year-to-life terms in the Utah State Prison, with counts
one and two running consecutively and counts three and four
running concurrently with the other two (R. 128-30).

The court

credited defendant for time served and ordered him to pay $2500

-2-

in fees, plus any counseling costs incurred by the victim and her
family (Id.).

Defendant filed a timely appeal (R. 134).
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS

Fifteen-year-old Beatriz, the victim, was just leaving her
mother's home around 7 p.m. on October 15th to visit a friend,
when her sister's husband drove up and offered her a ride (R.
158: 15-16).

Once on their way, defendant told Beatriz he was

going to stop at a motel where some people were drinking (Id. at
16).

He asked if she wanted to stop with him, and she said yes

(Id. at 17) .
Defendant drove to a room at the nearby Capitol Motel on
State Street (Id. at 63). No one was there.

Defendant told

Beatriz that people were coming, so they sat down, had a beer,
and talked (Id^ at 17-18).
Eventually, Beatriz decided it was time to go and got up to
leave (Id. at 19). Defendant, however, told her that she could
not leave and blocked the door with his body.

When she tried to

push her way out, he forced her back, onto the bed, and ordered
her to undress (Id.).

She refused.

and raped her (Id. at 20-21).

He then took her clothes off

She testified that when she asked

him why, he said it was her sister's fault:
I told him why was he doing it? He told me
because my sister, that she took everything
away from him and she made life so bad for
him that he was going to do it to her.
Id. at 20.

Beatriz testified that when she tried to get away,

defendant choked her "to where I couldn't breathe" (Id.).
-3-

She

also stated: "I could hear somebody in the next room and I tried
to scream and he'd cover my mouth and start choking me" (Id.).
To keep Beatriz quiet, defendant forced her to take cocaine,
which he was also using along with alcohol (Id. at 20, 23).
Beatriz testified, "It made me feel like I - I don't know, I just
couldn't feel anything, like I was just numb" (Id. at 23). She
said the drug made her "just lay there.

When it would start to

wear off[,] I would start to scream again" (Id. at 23-24).
A few hours into the ordeal, defendant raped Beatriz a
second time (Id. at 22, 27). He also penetrated her digitally
and forced her to put his penis in her mouth (Id. at 22; R. 159:
116).

After the sun rose the next morning, defendant threatened

to kill Beatriz (Id^ at 24).
Beatriz's ordeal finally ended when the motel manager
knocked on the door around 11 a.m. to announce check-out time
(Id. at 25). At that juncture, defendant drove Beatriz home,
where she reported defendant's crimes to her family.

They took

her to the hospital and called the police (Id. at 25).
A forensic nurse who examined Beatriz that afternoon
reported that Beatriz's injuries were consistent with the events
she had described (R. 159: 118-20) . Beatriz had bite marks and
red and purple bruising on her throat; evidence of capillaries
bursting on her neck; bruising on her left upper arm, right
wrist, left calf, under her eyes and on her cheeks and posterior;
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and four sites of vaginal injury, including one large vaginal cut
consistent with a fingernail (Id. at 112-13, 115-17, 120).
Defendant's estranged wife tried unsuccessfully to help the
police find him.

She testified that she did not see or hear from

defendant after the date of these crimes (Id. at 54-56).

A

childhood friend of defendant's, who had rented the motel room
because defendant said he had no money, also testified that he
had not seen defendant since October 15th (Id. at 58-59).
Finally, the general manager of a restaurant at which defendant
briefly worked testified that defendant left his employment
abruptly in mid-October and did not pick up his last paycheck
(Id. at 90) .
Three years later, police located defendant in Georgia and
extradited him back to Utah (R. 159: 126). Defendant claimed
that he did not commit the crimes against Beatriz and that he was
in Mexico at the time, having been deported on September 9th of
that year (Id^ at 130, 134).
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Defendant asserts on appeal that his counsel performed
ineffectively by failing to request defendant's presence or
object to his absence at the in-chambers voir dire questioning of
one juror.

In a related argument, because he did not preserve

his claim below, he contends that the trial court committed plain
error by permitting the voir dire to proceed without defendant

-5-

either being present or expressly waiving his right to be
present.
To prevail under either ineffective assistance of counsel or
plain error, defendant must establish that he suffered prejudice.
And, to demonstrate prejudice in the context of voir dire,
defendant must show that his ability to gain the information
necessary for the informed exercise of his right to challenge the
juror was "substantially impaired."
Defendant has failed to make the required showing.

When the

juror responded to a question with a potentially problematic
answer, the court asked him three follow-up questions.
Apparently satisfied with the responses, the court then accorded
defense counsel the opportunity to ask additional follow-up
questions.

Counsel, similarly satisfied, declined.

Moreover,

defendant has nowhere articulated what he would have asked or
what he might have learned, had he been present.

He merely

speculates that his presence would have led to more information.
Where the court did not restrict voir dire and where
defendant only speculatively asserts harm, defendant has failed
to demonstrate that his ability to glean information necessary
for the informed exercise of his right to challenge the juror was
in any way impaired.

Defendant's claim thus fails.
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ARGUMENT
DEFENSE COUNSEL DID NOT RENDER
INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE NOR DID THE
TRIAL COURT COMMIT PLAIN ERROR
WHERE THE RECORD REFLECTS THAT
DEFENSE COUNSEL WAS ACCORDED EVERY
OPPORTUNITY TO GLEAN THE
INFORMATION NECESSARY TO EVALUATE
THE POTENTIAL JUROR
Defendant asserts two related arguments.

First, he contends

that his counsel performed deficiently by failing "to request the
defendant's presence or to object to his absence during the jury
voir dire conference in judge's chambers" (Br. of Aplt. at 24).
He asserts that he was prejudiced because empaneling the juror
"likely . . . had a profound effect in jury deliberations to the
detriment of [defendant's] case" and because "his constitutional
right to be present. . . is of such magnitude that any violation
should not be considered harmless" (Id. at 27)- 1
Second, defendant contends that the trial court committed
plain error when it permitted voir dire to proceed in chambers
without defendant either being present or expressly waiving his
right to be present (Id. at 21). To allege prejudice, he asserts
that the "biased responses from a prospective juror certainly
would have influenced [defendant's] decisions regarding the use

1

Contrary to defendant's assertion, this Court has clearly
stated: "[A]ny error made at voir dire must be prejudicial to
require reversal." Depew v. Sullivan, 2003 UT App 152, 5 27, 71
P.3d 601, cert, denied,773 P.2d 338 (Utah 2003) (citation
omitted).
-7-

of for cause or peremptory challenges to remove said juror" (Id.
at 24).
A claim of ineffective assistance of counsel requires a
showing of both objectively deficient performance and prejudice.
State v. Litherland, 2000 UT 76, 11 16-11,

12 P.3d 92. A claim

of plain error requires a showing of obvious legal error and
prejudice.

State v. Dunn, 850 P.2d 1201, 1208 (Utah 1993).

As to ineffectiveness, defendant's claim of deficient performance
presumes that he had an absolute legal right to be present during
supplemental, in-chambers voir dire.

The State, however, does

not concede that defendant had such a right.

See State v.

Hubbard, 2002 UT 45, 533, 48 P.3d 953 (declining to analyze
whether cited authorities "are so broad as to guarantee a right
to be present during sidebar discussions between the court and
the prospective jurors").2

Similarly, as to plain error, the

alleged error could not have been obvious to the trial court

2

The supreme court in Hubbard assumed, "without deciding
the issue, for purposes of this appeal," that defendant had such
a right, but that he waived it by failing to assert it. Hubbard,
2002 UT 45, 1133-34. The court stated, "[A] defendant knowing of
a discussion must assert whatever right he may have to be
present." Id. at 534 (citing United States v. Gaqnon, 470 U.S.
522, 528 (1985)). Here, defendant concedes that no objection was
made to his absence at voir dire. See Br. of Aplt. at 22.
Accordingly, to circumvent the waiver doctrine, he brings his
claim under the rubric of plain error or ineffective assistance
of counsel.
-8-

because the law nowhere explicitly holds that defendant had an
unfettered right to be present.3
In any event, the Court need not resolve this question
because defendant's claim so clearly fails on the common
prejudice prong.

"When defendant raises the issues of both plain

error and ineffective assistance of counsel, ^a common standard
is applicable.'" State v. Ellifritz, 835 P.2d 170, 174 (Utah App.
1992)(quoting State v. Verde, 770 P.2d 116, 124 n.15 (Utah
1989)); accord State v. Brooks, 868 P.2d 818, 822 (Utah App.
1994).

"Because the defendant must show prejudice to prevail

under either argument, the ^common standard' . . . functions as
an analytical shortcut that avoids treatment of the other prongs
of the ineffective assistance and plain error standards."
Litherland, 2000 UT 76 at 131 n.14.
This Court has noted that the traditional concept of
prejudicial error "is impossible to apply in the context of voir
dire questioning."
App. 1993).

Barrett v. Peterson, 868 P.2d 96, 103 (Utah

This Court explained in an analogous context:

An appellant claiming that the trial court's
unreasonable limitation of voir dire
substantially impaired his ability to
exercise peremptory challenges simply cannot
prove, in the traditional way, that prejudice
resulted from the error. Appellant cannot
show with any certainty that had certain
questions been asked, particular responses
3

Moreover, even assuming the law did so hold, the court
would have no way of knowing, based on the record before this
Court, that defendant objected to his attorney handing the
proceeding without him.
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would have been received; that certain jurors
would then have been challenged for cause or
peremptorily; and that particular, more
favorably predisposed jurors would have been
seated instead, who would have deliberated to
a different result. Accordingly, in this
context, we apply the test enunciated in
Hornsby: Prejudicial error is shown if the
appellant's right to the informed exercise of
peremptory challenges has been "substantially
impaired." 758 P.2d [929] at 933 [Utah App.
1988].
Id.
Defendant here cannot prevail on his claims of ineffective
assistance and plain error because he has not, and cannnot,
demonstrate that he did not have an adequate opportunity to gain
the information necessary to evaluate the juror to whom he now
objects.

Id. at 102-03.

The juror in question, Mr. Erickson,

was one of five jurors individually called into chambers for
"more personal questions outside the presence of the other
jurors" (R. 163: 39). The court called Mr. Erickson in because
he responded affirmatively to a query about whether he had been a
victim of sexual assault or knew such a victim (Id. at 48).
After explaining the circumstances that prompted his response,
Mr. Erickson engaged in the following colloquy with the court:
The Court:

This is a separate independent
case. Do you think you can sit in
judgment . . . and put that kind of
out of your mind and judge —

Juror:

Yeah.

The Court:

— [defendant] independently of
anything that previously happened?

Juror:

I think sor yeah.
-10-

The Court:

Do you believe in your mind that
[defendant] is innocent until
proven guilty?

Juror:

Yes, I do.

The Court:

Do you feel that [defendant] has
any obligation to you to prove his
innocence?

Juror:

Is that not why we're here?

The Court:

Yeah. But do you understand that
he has no obligation to prove his
innocence, the State has the
obligation?

Juror:

All right, yeah.

The Court:

Do you understand that?

Juror:

Yeah.

The Court:

Do you have any problem with that?

Juror:

I do not.

The Court:

[Defense Counsel], do you have any
follow-up questions?

Defense Counsel: No, Judge.
R. 163: 49-50 at addendum A.
Under the factual circumstances of this case, defendant's
ability to glean, through his counsel, the knowledge necessary to
effectively exercise his right to challenge the juror was not
impaired.

When Mr. Erickson suggested that defendant might be

obliged to establish his own innocence, the court immediately
pursued his possible misconception by asking three follow-up
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questions to clarify the prospective juror's thinking.4

See

State v. Bishop, 753 P.2d 439, 451 (Utah 1988) (once statements
made during voir dire raise question of partiality, court should
investigate further and either find the inference rebutted or
remove the juror).

Mr. Erickson's unequivocal responses to the

court's final two rehabilitative inquiries indicated that he
fully understood the burden of proof and accepted it willingly.
See R. 163: 50 at addendum A.

Once the court satisfied itself

that the juror was not biased, it then accorded defense counsel
the opportunity to ask additional clarifying questions.
Defense counsel declined the invitation.

Id.

Id.

Under these circumstances, where the court did not restrict
voir dire in any way, defendant had every opportunity to glean
the relevant information necessary to evaluate whether Mr.
Erickson should serve on the jury.

Moreover, defendant has not

proffered what he might have asked had he been present that his
counsel failed to ask.

See State v. Arguelles, 921 P.2d 439, 441

(Utah 1996) (speculative claims cannot be substituted for proof of
prejudice).

Nor has he suggested what he would have learned if

he had been present that his counsel did not learn.

Id.

He

merely speculates that his presence might have given him
4

Defendant cites the court's query, "Do you feel that
[defendant] has any obligation to you to prove his innocence?"
and the juror's "somewhat equivocal" response, "Is that not why
we're here?" (Br. of Aplt. at 24). Defendant makes no mention,
however, of the court's next three rehabilitative queries or of
his counsel's opportunity to ask additional follow-up questions.
-12-

unspecified but dispositive information.

In short, defendant has

not demonstrated that his ability to exercise his challenges was
in any way impaired by his absence from chambers.
Indeed, there was no basis for a challenge for cause, and
had defense counsel wished to exercise one of his peremptory
challenges, he certainly could have done so.

Consequently,

having failed to establish prejudice, defendant's claims of
ineffective assistance of counsel and plain error both fail.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated, this Court should affirm defendant's
convictions for one count each of aggravated kidnaping and three
counts of aggravated sexual assault, all first degree felonies.
RESPECTFULLY submitted this p( I day of January, 2005.
MARK L. SHURTLEFF
Attorney General
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JOANNE C. SLOTNIK
Assistant Attorney General
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